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Diagnosing Administrative Law: 
A Comment on Clyde River and 
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation 
Kate Glover Berger* 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DUTY TO CONSULT’S DIAGNOSIS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks, Binnie J. observed that 
administrative law processes and remedies are sufficiently nimble and 
robust to account for the constitutional rights and interests of Indigenous 
Peoples.1 The comment, directed to a procedural issue, disclosed a faith 
in existing frameworks of Canadian administrative law to compel 
government actors to act honourably and respond meaningfully when 
Indigenous communities are, or could be, affected by government action. 
This faith was not intended to diminish or downplay the constitutional 
character of the honour of the Crown or the duty to consult and 
accommodate. Rather, it affirmed that this principle and these duties are 
not only matters of interest to constitutional law, but are also of particular 
concern for the law of good government decision-making; that is, for 
administrative law. There was no need therefore, in Binnie J.’s 
conception of Canadian state public law, to develop novel constitutional 
remedies to address failures of consultation or dishonourable public 
decision-making practices. Rather, the remedies of administrative law, 
with their capacities to declare, quash and compel, already offered 
mechanisms for substantial redress and the pursuit of reconciliation.  
                                                                                                                       
* B.A. (McGill), LL.B. (Dalhousie), LL.M. (Cambridge), D.C.L. (McGill). Assistant 
Professor, Faculty of Law, Western University. A draft of this paper was presented at the 21st 
Annual Osgoode Hall Constitutional Cases Conference on April 13, 2018. Thank you to Sonia 
Lawrence and Benjamin Berger for inviting me to participate and for their expertise all along. Thank 
you also to the Conference participants, whose questions and comments helped to advance the 
arguments in this paper. A final thank you to the reviewers and editors of the Supreme Court Law 
Review, whose insights were invaluable in sharpening and clarifying the piece.  
1  [2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53, at para. 47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little 
Salmon/Carmacks”]. 
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There is nothing intrinsic to the field of administrative law that would 
prevent Binnie J.’s observation from becoming a reality, rather than 
simply an aspiration. Shortcomings tend to arise through theory and 
practice, through choice and decision, through historical inheritances and 
present biases, not through the identification of a field itself. Further, the 
fact that Aboriginal and treaty rights and the honour of the Crown are of 
a constitutional character does not mean that they automatically overflow 
the containers of flexibility and responsiveness that administrative 
remedies and review can offer. Administrative law strives to 
accommodate the full range of legal principles, rules, traditions, and 
remedies that govern government decision-making and there is nothing 
in the logic or ethic of administrative law that necessarily precludes the 
attainment of this goal. That said, given the breadth of the field and its 
ambition, the health of administrative law cannot be taken for granted; 
regular check-ups are needed.  
One part of checking in on the health of administrative law, the part 
with which this paper is concerned, is to test the accuracy of Binnie J.’s 
diagnosis of the state of the relationship between administrative law and 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2 To do so,3 this paper examines 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent cases dealing with the duty to 
consult — Clyde River4 and Chippewas of the Thames5 — in light of 
Binnie J.’s claim. As will be discussed in greater detail below, these cases 
speak directly to the current state of the law on consultation, administrative 
law, and the relationship between them. These decisions show that the 
courts conceive of the core principles and rules of Canadian state law on 
the duty to consult as relatively stable. Haida Nation is the legal lodestar 
for consultation and accommodation, setting out the principles  
that underlie the duty, as well as the analytical frameworks that should be 
used to work through questions of consultation in individual cases.6  
                                                                                                                       
2  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
3  Many others have explored aspects of this relationship. See, e.g., Sari Graben & Abbey 
Sinclair, “Tribunal Administration and the Duty to Consult: A Study of the National Energy Board” 
(Fall 2015) 65 U.T.L.J. 382; Janna Promislow, “Irreconcilable? The Duty to Consult and 
Administrative Decision Makers” (2013) Cdn. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 251. 
4  Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC 40 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clyde River”]. 
5  Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 41, 
2017 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chippewas of the Thames”]. 
6  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 
73 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”]. 
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The post-Haida Nation cases — Carrier Sekani,7 Little Salmon/Carmacks 
First Nation8 and Tsilhqot’in Nation9 — then fill in many of the details. 
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, along with a third recent case 
that deals with a duty to consult issue, Ktunaxa,10 do not test the holdings 
of these foundational cases; they apply and clarify them, adding some 
nuance in not unexpected ways. In Clyde River and Chippewas of the 
Thames, for example, the Court confirms that the actions of independent 
regulatory agencies can trigger the Crown’s duty to consult. Further, these 
cases affirm that the Crown can rely on the processes of these 
administrative tribunals and agencies to satisfy its duty to consult and 
accommodate, as long as the statutory powers of the agency allow for 
processes that can satisfy the duty. Further still, Clyde River and 
Chippewas of the Thames clarify that administrative decision-makers 
cannot make final decisions that could adversely affect the rights and 
interests of Indigenous Peoples without assessing whether the consultative 
demands of section 35(1) have been met. A decision taken without such an 
assessment is unconstitutional. Then Ktunaxa applies Haida Nation, 
confirming that upon judicial review, a government conclusion that adequate 
consultation and accommodation have taken place is entitled to deference, to 
be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.  
These holdings show that Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, 
along with Ktunaxa, fit comfortably in the arc of contemporary duty to 
consult jurisprudence. So too, this paper argues, do they fit within the 
trajectory of modern administrative law writ large. Over the past several 
decades, a paradigm shift has unfolded in contemporary administrative law 
jurisprudence, namely a shift from demonstrable skepticism and fear of the 
administrative state to evident comfort and trust in administrative decision-
makers. The courts have come to conceive of the administrative state as vital 
to effective governance. Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames fit neatly 
within this narrative of confidence and trust. Indeed, these recent cases draw 
attention to the narrative of confidence, which was previously latent and 
abstract, and expose some of its implications. In bringing this narrative into 
high relief, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames reveal insights into 
                                                                                                                       
7  Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] S.C.J. No. 43, 2010 SCC 
43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carrier Sekani”]. 
8  Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra, note 1. 
9  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44 (S.C.C.). 
10  Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands, and Resources Operations), [2017] 
S.C.J. No. 54, 2017 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ktunaxa”]. 
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the current state not only of the law on the duty to consult, but also — and 
perhaps more starkly — of administrative law more broadly.  
In this paper, I examine the 2017 decisions of Clyde River and 
Chippewas of the Thames in light of Binnie J.’s faith in administrative 
law. In Part II, I sketch the shifts in administrative law jurisprudence that 
set the foundations of the narrative of confidence within which Binnie’s 
comments are nested. Then, in Part III, I outline the primary lessons and 
developments on the duty to consult from the Supreme Court’s opinions 
in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames and indicate how they 
continue this narrative.  
In Part IV, I turn to the ways that Clyde River and Chippewas of the 
Thames also expose how judicial confidence in the administrative state 
has implications relevant not only to the duty to consult, but also to the 
future health of administrative law and public decision-making. This 
section focuses on two examples of these implications, striving to 
describe rather than resolve the challenges revealed. The first example 
deals with the process of consultation and warns against bestowing such 
responsibility on administrative decision-makers while simultaneously 
neglecting to hold other state institutions accountable for their own 
duties of consultation and good governance. The second deals with the 
process of judicial review of administrative action and sharpens 
existing concerns about relying on categories of question as proxies for 
qualitative assessments of context in the standard of review analysis.  
I conclude in Part V by signalling a final lesson learned, and question 
raised, about the narrative of confidence in Clyde River and Chippewas 
of the Thames. The lesson stems from the holding in Chippewas of the 
Thames that administrative agencies “must usually” provide reasons to 
address concerns about the adequacy of consultation, but that neither a 
“formulaic ‘Haida analysis’” nor explicit reasons are necessarily 
required.11 Here, the Court’s faith in sound administrative judgment 
despite the absence of reasons highlights the chronic idealism with which 
the courts have treated administrative decision-making. And this idealism 
raises the forward-looking question posed in Part V: What should, indeed 
what must, a meaningful conception of confidence demand of the 
administrative state?  
                                                                                                                       
11  Clyde River, supra, note 4, at paras. 41 and 42; Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 5, 
at para. 63. 
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II. CONFIDENCE IN THE REGULATORY STATE 
The narrative in contemporary Canadian public law about the 
administrative state has changed since the early days of administrative 
law. Over the past four decades, with the explosive growth of the 
administrative state across the 20th century, scholarly skepticism about 
the capacity of regulatory agencies and independent statutory tribunals to 
serve as legal decision-makers and act in accordance with law, has given 
way to faith in administrative actors as essential to the modern state. 
Fears about reckless and arbitrary exercises of executive discretion have 
waned somewhat, with debates now focused on how best to manage 
discretionary decision-making power rather than how to avoid or stifle 
it.12 A shift towards trust or confidence in the administrative state has also 
been apparent in Canadian public law jurisprudence over the last half-
century.13 A close reading of the case law reveals several developments and 
turns in the law, each one reflecting a deepening judicial appreciation of the 
work of administrative decision-makers and their contribution to access to 
justice, the delivery of public programs, and effective governance. Together, 
these turns in the law and scholarship signal a broader shift in conceptions of 
the administrative state in Canada’s public order, a shift from skepticism to 
confidence, from fear to respect, from toleration to embrace.  
While not exhaustive, for the purposes of this paper, there are three 
turns in the modern case law that are particularly revealing of the 
confidence in the administrative state that has emerged in Canadian 
public law. The first is found in the transformation of judicial resistance 
to administrative power into a posture of judicial deference to 
administrative decisions, including deference on questions of law and 
statutory interpretation.14 While the courts still exercise powers of 
                                                                                                                       
12  For a helpful summary of this transition, see, e.g., Colleen M. Flood & Jennifer Dolling, 
“A Historical Map for Administrative Law: There Be Dragons” in Colleen M. Flood & Lorne 
Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in Context, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Emond Publications, 2018)  
1 [hereinafter “Flood & Sossin”]. 
13  On the constitutional implications of these turns in the law, see Kate Glover, “The 
Constitutional Status of the Administrative State” (February 20, 2018), online: Double Aspect 
<https://doubleaspectblog.wordpress.com>.  
14  See, e.g., CUPE Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] S.C.J. No. 45, [1979] 
2 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.); Union des employés de service, local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] S.C.J. No. 101, 
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bibeault”]; Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent 
of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J. No. 58, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.); Canada (Director of Investigation 
and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1996] S.C.J. No. 116, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 (S.C.C.); Pushpanathan 
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pushpanathan”]; Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 
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exacting review under a correctness standard in some cases,15 this is now 
the exception rather than the norm. A “well-established presumption” has 
emerged, such that when an administrative body interprets its home 
statute or statutes familiar to it, an interpretive task at the heart of 
administrative action, the reasonableness standard will apply.16 Indeed, 
the Court has accepted that “the fact that the legislature has allocated 
authority to a decision maker other than the courts is itself an indication 
that the legislature intended deferential review”.17 This deferential 
approach reflects a judicial appreciation for the expertise of 
administrative bodies within their statutory realm, a respect for the 
capacity of specialized decision-makers to respond nimbly to the 
questions of regulation and policy that arise before them, and a 
sensitivity to the wisdom and intent of the legislature in the design of 
regulatory agencies. And in this commitment to deference, we see an 
institutional identity shift not only for administrative decision-makers, 
but also for the courts. That is, the courts are abandoning the premise that 
judges are always best suited to respond to legal disputes and valuing  
the authority, competence, and expertise of decision-makers within  
the administrative state. Showing deference is, in some measure, an act 
of trust. 
The second turn in the jurisprudence that exposes the courts’ 
confidence in the administrative state is found in judicial interpretation of 
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.18 Section 96 protects the special 
status and core jurisdiction of the superior courts, striving to shield the 
country’s courts of general jurisdiction from legislative or executive 
attack.19 This section of the Constitution can thus be used to challenge 
legislation that creates new administrative bodies that deal with matters 
historically resolved by the superior courts. In the early eras of Canadian 
administrative law, a protectionist stance prevailed, with the courts 
interpreting section 96 in ways that constrained the growth of the 
                                                                                                                       
9 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunsmuir”]; West Fraser Mills Ltd. v. British Columbia (Workers’ 
Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [2018] S.C.J. No. 22, 2018 SCC 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “West 
Fraser Mills”]; Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2018] S.C.J. No. 31, 2018 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canada (CHRC)”].  
15  For when correctness applies, see Dunsmuir, id., at paras. 57-61. 
16  Canada (CHRC), supra, note 14, at para. 27. 
17  Id., at para. 50. 
18  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
19  MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] S.C.J. No. 101, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “MacMillan Bloedel”]. 
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administrative state.20 And yet by the mid-20th century, the courts had 
pivoted to a facilitative position, recognizing generous legislative 
authority within section 96 to establish new regulatory bodies and quasi-
judicial tribunals that were connected to government policy goals and 
coherent in their design.21 As Lamer C.J.C. explained in concurring 
reasons in Reference re Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act 
(N.S.), a case about the constitutionality of Nova Scotia’s residential 
tenancies scheme, the flexible jurisprudential approach to section 96 
emerged from “sympathy for the proposition that s. 96 should not be 
interpreted so as to thwart or unduly restrict the future growth of 
provincial administrative tribunals”.22 Rather, “‘[a]daptations must be 
permitted to allow the legislatures scope to deal effectively with 
emerging social problems and concerns, and to develop new techniques 
of dispute resolution and the expeditious disposition of relatively minor 
disputes’ for the benefit of its citizenry … After all, the Constitution is a 
document for the people and one of the most important goals of any 
system of dispute resolution is to serve well those who make use of it.”23 
Here, the affirmation of confidence in the administrative state is 
expressed through creating conditions in which it can flourish.  
The third illustrative turn in the case law emerges from the courts’ 
wrestling with questions about the constitutional jurisdiction of 
administrative actors. In the Supreme Court’s words, the relationship 
between the courts, the Constitution and administrative decision-makers 
has been “completely revised” over time.24 In the later decades of  
the 20th century, the historic judicial reluctance to recognize a  
direct relationship between administrative decision-makers and the 
Constitution25 was overtaken by a decisive trend: a move towards 
                                                                                                                       
20  See, e.g., Toronto Corp. v. York Corp., [1938] AC 415 (P.C.).  
21  See, e.g., Saskatchewan (Labour Relations Board) v. John East Iron Works Ltd., [1948] 
J.C.J. No. 5, [1949] A.C. 134 (P.C.); Québec (Procureur Général) v. Barreau de la province de 
Québec, [1965] S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.); Tomko v. Nova Scotia (Labour Relations Board), [1975] S.C.J. 
No. 111, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 112 (S.C.C.); Mississauga (City) v. Peel (Regional Municipality), [1979] 
S.C.J. No. 46, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 244 (S.C.C.); Reference re Residential Tenancies Act 1979 (Ontario), 
[1981] S.C.J. No. 57, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 (S.C.C.); Reference re Amendments to the Residential 
Tenancies Act (N.S), [1996] S.C.J. No. 13, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 186 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Residential 
Tenancies Reference No. 2”].  
22  Residential Tenancies Reference No. 2, id., at para. 28. 
23  Id.  
24  Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12, at para. 30 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Doré”].  
25  See, e.g., Cooper v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1996] S.C.J.  
No. 115, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cooper”]. 
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broadening the jurisdiction of administrative decision-makers over 
constitutional matters and loosening the exclusive judicial grip on 
constitutional interpretation. The law now recognizes, for example, that 
administrative decision-makers must engage widely and directly with the 
obligations and values of the Constitution as they execute their mandates. 
Administrative actors are on the front lines of interpreting and 
implementing constitutional rights and obligations in their interactions 
with the public.26 Accordingly, administrative decision-makers are bound 
to act in accordance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms27 and must exercise their discretion in ways that are infused 
with Charter values and substantive commitments to proportionality.28 As 
another example, the law now provides that public actors with the 
authority to decide questions of law are necessarily empowered to 
answer the constitutional questions attached to those legal matters and to 
grant remedies under section 24(1) of the Charter, unless such authority 
has been clearly revoked.29 Access to justice, administrative expertise, 
and constitutional logic demand nothing less.30 A final example is found 
in the deferential posture that the courts now take when reviewing 
discretionary decisions of administrative decision-makers that limit 
Charter rights or values.31 The deferential approach is intended to reflect 
the “distinct advantage that administrative bodies have in applying the 
Charter to a specific set of facts and in the context of their enabling 
                                                                                                                       
26  See, e.g., Vanessa MacDonnell, “The Civil Servant’s Role in the Implementation of 
Constitutional Rights” (2015) 13:2 Intl. J. Constitutional L. 383 [hereinafter “MacDonnell, ‘Civil 
Servant’”]. 
27  Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Conway, [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, 2010 SCC 22, at para. 79 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Conway”]. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
28  Doré, supra, note 24; Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. 
No. 12, 2015 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Loyola High School”]; Law Society of British Columbia 
v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “T.W.U. 
(B.C.)”]; Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No. 33, 2018 
SCC 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “T.W.U. (L.S.U.C.)”]. 
29  Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ 
Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, 2003 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”]; 
Conway, supra, note 27.  
30  Conway, id., at para. 79. See also Dunsmuir, supra, note 14, at para. 49; Martin, id. 
31  Doré, supra, note 24; Loyola High School, supra, note 28; T.W.U. (B.C.), supra, note 28; 
T.W.U. (L.S.U.C.), supra, note 28. For a critique of this approach, see the comments of Lauwers and 
Miller JJ.A. in Gehl v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] O.J. No. 1943, 2017 ONCA 319, at  
paras. 68-83 (Ont. C.A.) and T. (E.) v. Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board, [2017] O.J.  
No. 6142, 2017 ONCA 893, at paras. 102-125 (Ont. C.A.). 
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legislation”.32 In each of these examples, we see the courts’ confidence in 
the administrative state reflected in the law’s credence of the deepening 
intimacy between statutory actors and the Constitution.  
Read in light of this broader narrative of confidence in regulatory actors 
and these specific jurisprudential turns towards the administrative state, the 
Court’s principal holdings in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames are 
unsurprising. Both cases raised the issue of whether the actions of a 
regulatory agency, specifically, the National Energy Board (“Board” or 
“NEB”), can either trigger or satisfy the Crown’s duty to consult and 
accommodate under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. As is discussed 
in greater detail in Part II, the Court’s answer to both queries was, 
unanimously, yes. The Court also clarified that in making a final decision on a 
matter that might adversely affect Indigenous rights or interests, a regulatory 
body must assess whether the duty has been met. A decision taken in the 
absence of adequate consultation and accommodation is unconstitutional. In 
these clarifications and advancements of the law governing administrative 
actors in relation to section 35, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames 
First Nation slide easily into the narrative of confidence recounted above. 
They fit comfortably in the part of the story in which administrative actors 
are directly accountable to the Constitution and bear the responsibility of 
upholding constitutional principles and duties. Indeed, in these two cases, we 
see the Court conceiving of regulatory bodies as active participants in 
constitutional relationships between government and Indigenous Peoples, 
and affirming the role and responsibilities of administrative actors in the 
pursuit of reconciliation. In their holdings, these decisions are robust 
affirmations of the vital, active, and ultimately deserved role that 
administrative actors play in the architecture of Canada’s public order. In the 
strength of their commitments regarding the role of the administrative state in 
the structure of the Constitution and in the direct responsibilities and high 
expectations they place on statutory tribunals, these cases not only contribute 
to the narrative of confidence, but also help to push it out of the implicit realm.  
III. CONFIDENCE, REGULATORY AGENCIES AND THE DUTY TO 
CONSULT  
The Court’s opinions in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames 
stand for three propositions in relation to the role of administrative 
                                                                                                                       
32  Doré, supra, note 24, at para. 48.  
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agencies in the duty to consult. The first confirms that regulatory action 
can trigger the Crown’s duty to consult; the second affirms that the 
Crown can rely on regulatory processes to fulfil its duty to consult; and 
the third clarifies that administrative actors must consider the adequacy 
of consultation before issuing a final approval of a project.  
The facts in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames are similar; 
both involve corporate parties seeking approval from the National 
Energy Board for energy extraction projects. In Clyde River, three 
corporate parties (the “proponents”) applied to the Board to carry out 
offshore seismic testing for oil and gas resources. The tests involved 
towing airguns through Baffin Bay and Davis Strait, producing sound 
waves in order to locate and measure underwater energy resources. The 
proposed testing would last five years. The Board initiated an 
environmental assessment of the project and the Hamlet of Clyde River 
objected, raising concerns about the effects of the testing on the treaty 
right of the Inuit of Clyde River to harvest marine mammals in the 
Nunavut Settlement Area. The Inuit community in the Area relies on 
these mammals for physical, economic, cultural, and spiritual well-being. 
Their concerns about the impact of the testing were ultimately 
undisputed.  
Over the next two years, the project’s proponents met with the 
communities that would be affected by the testing. The proponents were 
often unable to answer basic questions about the impact of their project on 
the region’s marine mammals and so the Board suspended its assessment. 
Soon after, the proponents submitted to the Board a 4000-page document 
addressing the lingering queries. The document was posted online and 
delivered to the hamlet offices. It was not translated into Inuktitut. The 
Board resumed its assessment.  
Throughout the process, Clyde River and other organizations wrote to 
the Board and to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development, calling for further consultation. The Minister denied the 
request and the Board continued its deliberations. In 2014, the Board 
granted the proponents’ application, concluding that there had been 
adequate consultation of Indigenous communities. Further, according to 
the Board, while the testing could alter migration routes of marine 
mammals, increase their mortality, and thus negatively affect the 
harvesting of the mammals, the proponents would strive to mitigate the 
chances of significant adverse environmental effects.  
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In Chippewas of the Thames, Enbridge Pipelines applied to the 
National Energy Board under section 58 of the National Energy Board 
Act33 for exemptions from several filing requirements in relation to its 
Line 9 Pipeline project. If approved, the project would reverse the flow 
and increase the capacity of the Line 9 Pipeline, which has run across the 
traditional territory of the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation since 
1976. If granted, the exemptions would authorize Enbridge to proceed 
with the project without filing a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity. Under the National Energy Board Act, the Board was the final 
decision-maker on section 58 exemptions. 
The Board advised the Chippewas of the Thames and 18 other 
potentially affected Indigenous communities about the project and the 
Board’s process. The process included a public hearing in late 2013. The 
Chippewas of the Thames were granted intervener status, as well as 
funding from the Board to participate. In September 2013, before the 
hearing was held, the Chiefs of the Chippewas of the Thames and the 
Aamjiwnaang First Nation wrote to the Prime Minister, the Minister of 
Natural Resources, and the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development, raising concerns about the impact of the Enbridge project 
on the asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights of both communities. The 
letter urged the Ministers to initiate Crown consultation. In January 2014, 
after the Board hearing, the Minister of Natural Resources responded to 
the request for consultation. He indicated that the Crown relied on the 
Board’s process to fulfil the duty to consult in relation to this project. The 
Board ultimately approved the Enbridge project, holding that in light of 
the project’s limited scope, the affected Indigenous groups had sufficient 
opportunity to be heard through the Board’s process and meetings with 
Enbridge. Further, the Board concluded, any impact of the project on the 
rights and interests of Indigenous communities was likely to be minimal 
and appropriately mitigated.  
Clyde River and the Chippewas of the Thames each applied for 
judicial review of the Board’s decisions on the grounds of insufficient 
consultation. Clyde River was ultimately successful; the Chippewas of 
the Thames were not. At stake in each case was the Board’s role in 
triggering, satisfying, and assessing compliance with the duty to consult. 
Both Clyde River and the Chippewas of the Thames argued that the 
Crown’s constitutional obligations under section 35 could not be satisfied 
by a regulatory process in which the Crown did not participate.  
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The Supreme Court was unpersuaded, leading to the three principal 
holdings of these cases. These holdings reflect the comfort and trust that 
the law has come to find and have in the administrative state, a comfort 
with and trust in the authority, competence, and judgment of 
administrative actors, a comfort and trust of sufficient weight to sustain 
the responsibility of pursuing reconciliation between Indigenous Peoples 
and the Crown. I turn to these holdings now. 
First, the Court held that the actions of a regulatory agency, like 
decisions and authorizations issued by the National Energy Board, can 
constitute Crown action that triggers the duty to consult and 
accommodate. Justices Karakatsanis and Brown, writing for the Court, 
affirmed that the duty is a constitutional obligation owed by the Crown 
and that regulatory agencies are neither “the Crown”, strictly speaking, 
nor its agents. However, they held, these observations alone do not 
adequately account for the character of the administrative state or its 
connection to the Crown. “[O]nce it is accepted”, and it must be so 
accepted, they held, “that a regulatory agency exists to exercise executive 
power as authorized by legislatures, any distinction between its actions 
and Crown action quickly falls away.”34 The regulatory agency becomes 
“the vehicle through which the Crown acts” and it becomes unhelpful to 
distinguish between the Crown and an agency as final decision-maker on 
a resource project.35 The statutory body exercises its powers “on behalf 
of the Crown”36 and, as a result, its decisions constitute Crown action, 
which can then in turn trigger the duty to consult. Justices Karakatsanis 
and Brown explained, “the duty, like the honour of the Crown, does not 
evaporate simply because a final decision has been made by a tribunal 
established by Parliament, as opposed to Cabinet”.37 The final decisions 
of a regulatory agency, they held, can thus constitute Crown conduct that 
triggers the duty to consult.  
In this holding, the Court strives to reason from the realities of 
administrative justice, from a recognition that in the modern regulatory 
state, administrative actors are the primary decision-makers in most legal 
disputes and for most individuals interacting with or seeking an outcome 
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from the public sector,38 including in processes of regulating and 
approving resource projects and other public works with the potential to 
adversely affect Aboriginal and treaty rights. The Court’s aim to develop 
the law in line with the perceived realities of administrative action and 
their potential impact on Indigenous communities reflects the Court’s 
belief in the importance of the work of regulatory agencies and a 
confidence in the capacity of those agencies to carry out their mandates, 
once granted, in meaningful and serious ways. Such was the case in 
Clyde River. The Board issued a final decision regarding the proponents’ 
application to conduct seismic testing. In so doing, the Board was the 
vehicle through which the Crown acted and the duty to consult was 
triggered. The same was true in Chippewas of the Thames. The Board’s 
decision to approve the Enbridge project triggered the Crown’s duty to 
consult. “As a statutory body with the delegated executive responsibility 
to make a decision that could adversely affect Aboriginal and treaty 
rights”, the Court reasoned, “the NEB acted on behalf of the Crown in 
approving Enbridge’s application.”39 In that moment, the obligation to 
provide meaningful consultation, consultation to the constitutional 
standard, had to arise. To hold otherwise would be blind to the potential 
adverse effect of the Board’s processes on the constitutional rights of the 
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation.  
The second principal holding in Clyde River and Chippewas of the 
Thames is more accurately a confirmation, an affirmation that the Crown 
is entitled to rely on regulatory processes in order to fulfil its duty to 
consult. The Crown need not directly participate in the processes and 
indeed, according to the Court, need not supervise every instance of 
consultation. Rather, the critical query for the Crown will be whether the 
administrative agency has the statutory capacity to engage in adequate 
consultation and accommodation in the circumstances. By confirming 
this framework, read alongside its section 35 jurisprudence, the Court 
can be taken to signal its trust in the actors of the administrative state to 
execute their mandates in accordance with the principles and duties 
embodied in section 35, that is, to use their procedural discretion to 
respond meaningfully to the demands of the Constitution. It is, in effect, 
a confidence in the capacity of administrative decision-makers to act 
honourably.  
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On the facts of both Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, the 
Court concluded that the Crown was justified, at least in principle, in 
relying on the Board to fulfil the duty to consult. The Board, with its 
procedural powers to hold hearings, solicit information, impose 
conditions, conduct environmental assessments, and establish funding 
programs for public participation under the Canada Oil and Gas 
Operations Act (in Clyde River) and the National Energy Board Act (in 
Chippewas of the Thames), had the capacity to consult to the requisite 
constitutional threshold with the Inuit of Clyde River and the Chippewas 
of the Thames First Nation. Similarly, the Board, with its remedial 
authority to attach conditions and deny applications, had the capacity to 
accommodate the rights of Indigenous communities, when appropriate. 
So too, in its expertise in supervising energy projects, the Board had the 
institutional and technical expertise needed to conduct meaningful 
consultations and implement appropriate accommodations. In these 
circumstances, the Court held, the Crown was entitled to rely on the 
deliberative process of the Board to satisfy its obligation to engage in 
consultation with the Indigenous communities potentially affected by 
these energy projects. Confidence in the Board to make constitutional 
rights real was, in other words, justified. 
The third issue requiring the Court’s attention in Clyde River and 
Chippewas of the Thames dealt with the duty of regulatory agencies to 
consider Crown consultation before approving a project or taking other 
action. Drawing on Carrier Sekani40 and Conway,41 the Court stated a 
general rule, that “a tribunal empowered to consider questions of law 
must determine whether … consultation was constitutionally sufficient” 
as long as the issue is properly raised and the authority to decide 
constitutional questions has not been expressly withdrawn.42 In these 
circumstances, an administrative agency must consider the sufficiency  
of consultation in order to protect the constitutionality of its own 
decision. While the Crown always bears the responsibility to ensure that 
the honour of the Crown is upheld, “administrative decision makers have 
both the obligation to decide necessary questions of law raised before 
them and an obligation to make their decisions within the contours of  
the state’s constitutional obligations”.43 Again, the Court held, when the 
agency is the final decision-maker on a project, the agency’s power and 
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obligation to assess the adequacy of consultation does not depend on 
whether the government participates in the Board’s proceedings. Section 35 
is clear, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ. explained, in its demand for adequate 
consultation and uncompromising in its disdain for attempts to “pass the 
buck” of technical responsibility between government actors. Thus, the rule 
is simple: Once the Crown’s duty to consult has been triggered, “a decision 
maker may only proceed to approve a project if Crown consultation is 
adequate.”44 This is the case regardless of who bears ultimate responsibility 
for carrying out consultation, the Crown or the agency. And here, in the 
obligation of administrative actors to assess compliance with section 35 
before a project is approved or a decision is taken, to ensure that the state is 
not running roughshod over the rights of Indigenous Peoples, to uphold 
some of the most fundamental values of Canadian constitutionalism, is the 
signal of the Court’s faith in these regulatory actors to be active players in 
the pursuit of reconciliation. 
The Board lived up to the Court’s expectations in Chippewas of the 
Thames, but not in Clyde River. On the facts of Chippewas of the 
Thames, the Court concluded that the Crown was not only entitled to rely 
on the Board’s process to satisfy the duty to consult, but also that the 
duty had been satisfied. In the Court’s view, the Board provided the 
affected Indigenous communities with adequate opportunities to 
participate in the decision-making process. The Chippewas of the 
Thames seized this opportunity and participated in the proceedings as an 
intervener. They received funding from the Board to participate, tendered 
expert evidence, and made closing submissions at the hearing. Further, 
the Court held, the Board’s report assessed the potential impact of the 
Enbridge project on the rights of Indigenous communities and concluded 
that the potential for adverse effects was minimal and could be mitigated. 
Further still, the Board imposed a condition on Enbridge for continued 
consultation with Indigenous communities, which the Court held 
adequately accommodated the Aboriginal rights at stake. Finally, the 
Board provided reasons that were directly responsive to the issue of 
consultation and section 35. The reasons reviewed the evidence, 
identified the interests at stake, assessed the risks of the project, and 
imposed conditions on Enbridge. The Court concluded that although the 
Board did not discuss the degree of consultation required in the 
circumstances or engage in a Haida analysis, the Board’s reasons were 
sufficient to show that, taking the Chippewas of the Thames’ arguments 
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at their strongest, the Board had sufficiently considered the asserted 
Aboriginal and treaty rights and accommodated them where appropriate. 
This, the Court held, was “manifestly adequate” to satisfy both the 
Board’s and the Crown’s obligations under section 35 prior to granting 
the exemption.45 
The same was not true in Clyde River. On the facts of that case, the 
Board was the final decision-maker for the proponents’ application and 
the Crown’s duty to consult had been triggered. Further, the Board had 
the statutory authority to determine all relevant matters of fact and law 
and there was no indication that constitutional jurisdiction had been 
withdrawn. Accordingly, the Board was empowered to assess the 
sufficiency of consultation and indeed, was constitutionally obliged to 
withhold approval of the project until the threshold of sufficiency was 
met. And yet, the Court held, the Board failed to do so. The rights at risk 
were guaranteed by treaty and the potential for adverse impact was high. 
Thus, on the principles and framework well established in Haida, deep 
consultation was required. This threshold was not met. While the Crown 
was entitled to rely on the Board’s processes to fulfil the duty to consult, 
it failed to inform the Inuit of Clyde River that it was doing so. Further, 
while the Board assessed the project’s impacts on the marine mammal 
populations through its environmental assessment, it failed to consider 
the implications of the project on the treaty rights as rights, rather than as 
concerns about the environmental impact of the project. Finally, while 
the Board had the statutory capacity to provide meaningful consultation, 
it failed to do so. No oral hearings were held and affected parties were 
not provided funding to collect evidence or prepare expert reports. 
Further, the Inuit of Clyde River were never provided with accessible, 
substantive answers to their questions about the effect of the project on 
the marine mammal population. The Court explained that these 
procedural safeguards of participation, funding, and responsiveness are 
not a checklist of prerequisites for deep consultation, which will never be 
captured by a one-size-fits-all approach. But, the Court held, “their 
absence in this case significantly impaired the quality of consultation.”46 
The Board had not lived up to the confidence bestowed upon it and 
therefore its authorization of the project could not stand.  
By drawing administrative tribunals and regulatory agencies further 
into constitutional and treaty relationships, I am arguing that Clyde River 
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and Chippewas of the Thames act on impulses already familiar in 
administrative law. In these decisions, the tendency to trust the work of 
the administrative state manifests as confidence in the capacity of 
administrative decision-makers to exercise their mandates with due 
attention to the impact of their decisions on Aboriginal rights, to act 
honourably in their interactions with Indigenous Peoples and to refuse to 
act without assurance that their decisions advance the aspiration of 
reconciliation. These decisions thus fit comfortably into ongoing 
conversations in administrative law. The principal holdings of Clyde 
River and Chippewas of the Thames are consistent with Binnie J.’s belief 
in Little Salmon/Carmacks47 that administrative law is sufficiently robust 
to implement and guarantee constitutional forms of consultation. And 
yet, as is discussed in Part IV, when these decisions are examined more 
closely — when focus falls on the details and the practical implications 
of Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames — implications of the 
narrative of confidence for both the duty to consult and administrative 
law more broadly are brought into relief.  
IV. TROUBLES WITH CONFIDENCE 
The confidence in administrative actors that has developed in 
Canadian public law is intended, it seems, to be comforting. As noted 
above, administrative decision-makers are the most common legal 
decision-makers and the most frequent way in which citizens interact 
with the state. Modern governance has been “administerized” and with 
many positive results. The regulatory state has thus come to be treated in 
public law as effective, capable, and worthy of our trust, at least in its 
systemic, institutional dimensions.  
Within this context of administrative law discourse, it seems that the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames 
are also intended to be comforting. When much executive power is 
carried out in the administrative realm and when administrative actors 
enjoy much discretionary power, including significant discretion over 
who participates in decision-making and how, knowing that these 
administrative actors will be held accountable for triggering the duty to 
consult, carrying out meaningful consultation, and policing compliance 
with section 35 can offer some relief from concerns about the power of 
state actors to undermine constitutional rights.  
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However, a closer reading of the Court’s reasoning in Clyde River and 
Chippewas of the Thames on matters of consultation reveals some 
concerning consequences of the narrative of confidence for both the way 
the duty to consult is carried out and for the future of administrative law 
more generally. In this Part, I focus on two such consequences. The first 
deals with the process of consultation and, more particularly, the shifts in 
institutional responsibility and focus that flow from judicial confidence 
in administrative actors. The second deals with the process of judicial 
review and, more particularly, the continued reliance on categories of 
question in the standard of review analysis.  
1. The Process of Consultation and Shifting Accountabilities 
In Clyde River, the Court affirms that the duty to consult is, always 
and ultimately, a constitutional duty of the Crown. In each instance of 
public decision-making that may affect the rights and interests of 
Indigenous Peoples, “the Crown always holds ultimate responsibility for 
ensuring consultation is adequate.”48 Accordingly, when an 
administrative actor is the final decision-maker on a project and either 
fails to provide adequate consultation or does not have access to 
adequate consultative procedures in its statutory mandate, the Crown 
“must provide further avenues for meaningful consultation and 
accommodation in order to fulfill the duty prior to project approval.”49 
That said, despite the Crown’s ultimate responsibility for fulfilling the 
duty to consult and accommodate, it is not, according to the Court in 
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, responsible for overseeing, 
monitoring, or participating in each instance of administrative decision-
making. As Karakatsanis and Brown JJ. explain, “[p]ractically speaking” 
the fact that the Crown, in embodying its duty to act honourably, is the 
site of final constitutional responsibility for fulfilling the demands of 
section 35, “does not mean that a minister of the Crown must give 
explicit consideration in every case to whether the duty to consult has 
been satisfied, or must directly participate in the process of 
consultation.”50 Rather, as recounted above, the Crown is entitled to rely 
on regulatory actors to carry out the appropriate stages of consultation 
when those statutory decision-makers render the final decision on a 
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project. Consider, then, how the process might unfold for an Indigenous 
community involved in a determinative regulatory decision-making 
scheme in the post-Clyde River legal realm.  
Assuming that the agency’s prospective decision could adversely 
affect Aboriginal or treaty rights, whether those rights are established or 
claimed, the agency’s actions will trigger the duty to consult and, 
possibly, to accommodate. If the agency has access to procedural 
mechanisms that could satisfy the duty in its statutory mandate, the 
Crown is entitled to rely on the agency to satisfy the duty. Within this 
model, how is an Indigenous community to proceed if it contests the 
adequacy of the agency’s processes of consultation?  
Initially, it seems, the affected Indigenous community must wait for the 
agency to fail to live up to the constitutional standard and then initiate a 
gap-filling process with the Crown. Unlike a party seeking to challenge 
government action that contravenes the Charter, an Indigenous claimant or 
community concerned with the constitutionality of administrative action 
under section 35 cannot go directly to the courts to enforce the right. 
Instead, an Indigenous community must seek ad hoc relief from the 
Crown. As held in Clyde River, “[w]here the regulatory process being 
relied upon does not achieve adequate consultation or accommodation, the 
Crown must take further measures to meet its duty”.51 These measures 
could include the filling of procedural gaps, making submissions to the 
agency, requesting that the agency reconsider a decision, or pursuing 
legislative or regulatory amendments. When the regulatory agency is the 
final decision-maker in the process, it is responsible not only for carrying 
out consultation and implementing accommodations (with the additional 
possibility of some gap-filling by the Crown), but also for ultimately 
assessing, at first instance, whether the consultation and accommodation 
that have taken place are sufficient. Once a final assessment of adequate 
consultation is reached at the regulatory stage, judicial review is available 
to an Indigenous party seeking more meaningful consultation or more 
responsive accommodation of Aboriginal and treaty rights. As the Court 
confirms in both Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, “any decision 
affecting Aboriginal or treaty rights made on the basis of inadequate 
consultation will not be in compliance with the duty to consult, which is a 
constitutional imperative. Where challenged, it should be quashed on 
judicial review.”52 
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This procedural framework, on the one hand, fits into a narrative of 
confidence in the performance of administrative agencies within the 
architecture of the Canadian state. The central role of these agencies 
includes active participation in constitutional processes of consultation 
with Indigenous communities who are affected by government decision-
making. And yet, on the other hand, in this framework, administrative 
decision-makers do not bear accountability for their role in consultation 
commensurate with their constitutional responsibilities. Rather, the Crown 
must step in to fill the administrative decision-maker’s inadequacies. 
While this may provide opportunities for flexibility and consultation 
tailored to the context, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames also 
hold that the Crown is not legally required to supervise or monitor every 
instance of consultation that unfolds at the administrative level, nor is it 
legally required to inform the administrative actors that it intends to rely on 
the regulatory processes to fulfil the duty to consult. Although the Crown 
is under an obligation to inform affected Indigenous communities that it 
intends to rely on regulatory processes to satisfy its duty under section 35, 
Chippewas of the Thames shows that express notice is not required; silence 
can satisfy the duty to inform in the right circumstances. As such, the 
scheme set out in these decisions requires that Indigenous communities 
bear the burden of initiating, auditing, and alternating between 
communication with various administrative, executive, and potentially 
judicial, decision-makers to ensure that meaningful consultation takes place.  
The procedural framework emerging from Clyde River and 
Chippewas of the Thames not only reflects a belief in the administrative 
state as powerful, reliable, and trustworthy, but also, in line with a long 
thread in section 35 jurisprudence, expressly encourages negotiation over 
adjudication in the realization of Aboriginal and treaty rights. “[J]udicial 
review is no substitute for adequate consultation”, Karakatsanis and 
Brown JJ. write.53 “... True reconciliation is rarely, if ever, achieved in 
courtrooms. Judicial remedies may seek to undo past infringements of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights, but adequate consultation before project 
approval is always preferable to after-the-fact judicial remonstration 
following an adversarial process.”54 Consultation is, they continue, 
“‘[c]oncerned with an ethic of ongoing relationships’” and so, citing 
Haida, “‘negotiation is a preferable way of reconciling state and 
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Aboriginal interests’”.55 In the Court’s view, “no one benefits — not 
project proponents, not Indigenous peoples, and not non-Indigenous 
members of affected communities — when projects are prematurely 
approved only to be subjected to litigation.”56 
A structural framework that seeks to realize the aspirations of 
section 35 should facilitate robust opportunities for meaningful 
consultation before a project proceeds rather than through retrospective 
remedies. And relying on negotiation with ministerial actors and broad 
procedural discretion for regulatory agencies in order to satisfy the duty 
to consult and accommodate can facilitate processes that are tailored to 
the circumstances of each case and account for the rights at stake, the 
impact of the decision-making on those rights, and the historical context. 
Further, by locating ultimate responsibility for consultation with the 
Crown, the processes prescribed by Clyde River and Chippewas of the 
Thames are “responsive to Indigenous Peoples’ arguments to the extent 
that [they preserve] their relationship as with the Crown and not with 
arm’s length regulatory agencies such as the NEB”.57  
However, in favouring negotiation and case-by-case procedural 
responses, these two decisions also entrench a preference for 
discretionary, ad hoc and policy-based approaches to the pursuit of 
reconciliation over statutory frameworks of principle, procedure, and 
obligation that can, with careful attention and an embrace of animating 
principles, provide more robust constraints on discretion that would also 
be subject to formal constitutional scrutiny. When the Crown “can 
(indeed, must) correct any flaws in the consultation process” or when 
accountability stops at the level of the regulatory agency through judicial 
review, there is no motivation to inquire into the systemic barriers to 
reconciliation found in the governing legislative structures. Nor is there a 
constitutional basis to require legislative or regulatory design that 
implements “process[es] designed with the duty to consult in mind”.58 
Rather, the approach envisioned in Clyde River and Chippewas of the 
Thames contributes to the conditions in which “policy solutions [are 
preferred] over legislative frameworks that institutionalize Indigenous 
interests”.59 This approach avoids cultivating a culture of legislative and 
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regulatory design that is animated by the honour of the Crown and 
reconciliation. Recourse for inadequate processes that unfold either in 
practice or by design is to be found in the Crown and then ultimately the 
courts, rather than through the legislative process. In these ways, a firm 
commitment to a narrative of confidence in the regulatory state and in the 
Crown’s capacity to fill in the gaps may divert energies away from urging 
legislatures to participate, alongside all other state actors, in the pursuit of 
reconciliation by, for example, trying to cultivate administrative cultures 
and conditions for meaningful consultation through careful legislative 
drafting, mandate-setting, and administrative design.  
This reflection on the institutional and procedural structures that 
emerge from Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames is a reminder 
that a public order operates through a dynamic network of actors and 
elements, each linked to each other by constitutional history, experience, 
practice, and design. Given these links, the scope of authority of one 
actor within the network must be conceived with regard to the scope of 
authority of the others. Shifts in power and role for one will inevitably be 
felt by the others.60 Accordingly, when confidence attaches to the 
administrative state — just one part of the network — in ways and in 
places in which it did not historically attach, not only is an inquiry into 
the implications of confidence for administrative actors warranted, but so 
too is an inquiry into the impact of confidence on other institutions in the 
network, both individually and in relation to each other. These inquiries 
raise two questions: When the courts’ gaze is so set on the administrative 
state, which institutions fall out of focus and at what cost? And when the 
administrative state is seen to be powerful and trustworthy, which other 
institutional relationships are affected and how?  
The comments above have already offered the start of an answer to 
the first query by suggesting that the narrative of confidence might divert 
attention from legislative obligations in relation to section 35. In this 
way, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames serve as reminders that 
confidence in one set of actors need not, and must not, lead to neglect of 
the roles and responsibilities of other institutions. But these cases also 
offer some context relevant to the second query, which asks about the 
effect of a narrative of confidence on the relations and interactions 
between public institutions. Indeed, given the actors involved, these cases 
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offer a particularly useful context for reflecting on institutional 
relationships. In the usual administrative law case, the relationship of 
interest is that between the courts, the executive, and the legislature. But in 
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, the relevant relationships 
engage the courts, Parliament, the regulatory agency, the Crown and 
Indigenous Peoples. Unlike in the Charter context, for instance, in these 
cases the Court both distinguishes between the elements of the executive, 
attributing distinct roles and responsibilities to the Crown and the Board, 
and also notes their effective collapse into a single vehicle for carrying out 
government policy. I turn now to one of these institutional relationships. 
2. The Process of Judicial Oversight and the Choice of Standard of 
Review 
Recent case law bears witness to the Supreme Court’s struggle to 
conceive of and quantify deference in the exercise of judicial review of 
administrative action.61 The question of standard of review is a structural 
one, one with the relationships between the courts, the legislatures, the 
administrative state, and affected parties at its heart. A thick theory of 
standard of review must therefore tend to the roles of these institutions 
and actors, individually and in relation to each other, within Canada’s 
constitutional order.  
A narrative about the administrative state will inevitably inform and 
shape judicial approaches to standard of review. When the narrative is 
one of confidence and administrative actors are conceived as capable, 
competent contributors to the rule of law project, the justification for 
widespread deference is strengthened. As described in Part II, this has 
been the pattern of contemporary administrative law jurisprudence in 
Canada. Since Dunsmuir, presumptions of reasonableness as the 
applicable standard of review are common. That said, drawing a straight 
line between confidence and deference is too simple a response to the 
standard of review dilemma given the institutional roles and relationships 
involved. A narrative of confidence alone doesn’t tell us much about the 
effect of a strong legal conception of the administrative state on other 
institutions and their interactions, and what those effects might mean for 
a standard of review analysis.  
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames do not expressly address 
the issue of standard of review. This is itself a sign and symptom of the 
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Court’s uneven approach to deference in judicial review more generally. 
The Court’s reasoning in these cases suggests that reasonableness, or 
something akin to it, was at play.62 The Court started its review of the 
challenged decisions with the procedural choices of the Board, assessing 
the justifiability of those choices in the decision-making context. This is 
the methodology of reasonableness.63 Further, Ktunaxa, released shortly 
after Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, confirms that 
reasonableness applies when a court reviews a minister’s determination 
that consultation was adequate.64 Ktunaxa dealt with the decision of 
British Columbia’s Minister of Forests, Lands, and Natural Resources 
Operations to approve the development of a ski resort on the spiritual 
territory of the Ktunaxa Nation. While the primary issue was whether the 
Minister’s decision was consistent with the Ktunaxa’s right of religious 
freedom under the Charter, the Court also considered whether the 
Minister had consulted adequately with the Ktunaxa before authorizing 
the development. In doing so, the Court confirmed that reasonableness 
was the appropriate standard when assessing the adequacy of 
consultation. It is notable that in Ktunaxa, the applicable standard of 
review was taken as settled law, with McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J. 
concluding (for the Court on this point), “[t]he Minister’s decision that 
an adequate consultation and accommodation process occurred is entitled 
to deference”.65 Elaborating, McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J. held, “[t]he 
chambers judge was required to determine whether the Minister 
reasonably concluded that the Crown’s obligation to consult and 
accommodate had been met. A reviewing judge does not decide the 
constitutional issues raised in isolation on a standard of correctness, but 
asks rather whether the decision of the Minister, on the whole, was 
reasonable.”66 
Despite the suggestion to the contrary in Ktunaxa, the issue of 
standard of review on matters of adequacy of consultation is not settled. 
Before Dunsmuir, the Court speculated in Haida Nation that questions of 
adequacy of consultation would be reviewed on a standard of 
                                                                                                                       
62  Although, the Court also holds that “any decision affecting Aboriginal or treaty rights 
made on the basis of inadequate consultation will not be in compliance with the duty to consult, 
which is a constitutional imperative. Where challenged, it should be quashed on judicial review.”: 
Clyde River, supra, note 4, at para. 24. This may suggest that they were imagining a standard of 
correctness applied.  
63  Dunsmuir, supra, note 14. 
64  Supra, note 10. 
65  Id., at para. 77.  
66  Id.  
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reasonableness.67 More recently, and post-Dunsmuir, the Court has 
reasoned that correctness is the more appropriate standard for questions 
of adequacy of consultation given their constitutional character. The 
Court in Little Salmon/Carmacks held that the adequacy of consultation 
would be reviewed on a standard of correctness:  
In exercising his discretion under the Yukon Lands Act and the 
Territorial Lands (Yukon) Act, the Director was required to respect 
legal and constitutional limits. In establishing those limits no deference 
is owed to the Director. The standard of review in that respect, 
including the adequacy of the consultation, is correctness. A decision 
maker who proceeds on the basis of inadequate consultation errs in law. 
Within the limits established by the law and the Constitution, however, 
the Director’s decision should be reviewed on a standard of 
reasonableness: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 
S.C.R. 190, and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 
SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339. In other words, if there was adequate 
consultation, did the Director’s decision to approve the Paulsen grant, 
having regard to all the relevant considerations, fall within the range of 
reasonable outcomes?68 
On the Little Salmon/Carmacks approach, only an administrative 
decision-maker’s final decision whether to approve a project, a matter 
distinct from adequacy of consultation, is to be reviewed on a standard of 
reasonableness. The adequacy of the consultation must be correctly 
decided.  
In light of Little Salmon/Carmacks, the decisiveness of the choice of 
standard of review in Ktunaxa becomes surprising, although the reliance 
on categories of question is not. This reliance is consistent with the 
prevailing standard of review analysis set out in Dunsmuir. On the 
Dunsmuir model, the standard of review will most often be decided 
according to the category in which the impugned question falls, rather 
than in light of the administrative and statutory context in which the 
question arises and is to be decided. For example, questions of fact and 
of mixed fact and law call for deference (that is, a reasonableness 
standard), while questions of jurisdiction, of the boundaries between 
administrative decision-makers and of procedure are to be reviewed 
more strictly (that is, on a correctness standard).69 Further, administrative 
                                                                                                                       
67  Supra, note 6, at paras. 62, 63. 
68  Supra, note 1, at para. 48. 
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decisions on some constitutional questions, like matters of the division of 
powers or the principles of fundamental justice,70 will not be shown 
deference, while decisions on other constitutional matters, like a 
decision’s compliance with Charter values,71 will be reviewed on a 
standard of reasonableness. On the Dunsmuir model, assigning an 
impugned question to a category serves as a proxy for assessing the 
constellation of contextual factors that might inform and shape the proper 
standard of review. 
The category-based analysis established in Dunsmuir was intended to 
avoid the analytical uncertainties and debates that flowed from the 
contextual “pragmatic and functional” approach72 that preceded it. 
However, the post-Dunsmuir case law shows that the uncertainties and 
debates have not disappeared; they have simply been repackaged into 
uncertainties and debates about which category best describes an 
impugned question.73 What is missing in Dunsmuir and in subsequent 
cases, including in Ktunaxa, is a principled account of how to choose 
when an issue can be comfortably described in terms of several different 
categories. The need for such an account arises in Ktunaxa, Clyde River 
and Chippewas of the Thames. The question of adequacy of consultation 
is simultaneously a procedural question, a constitutional question, and a 
question of fact and law. And yet, the Court in Ktunaxa concluded, 
without explanation, that the issue’s character as a question of fact and 
law was determinative. Why might this be the case? Ktunaxa does not 
offer an answer and indeed, ignores the question. And so, we are left 
wondering why an executive decision-maker is owed more deference in 
the context of procedural obligations arising under section 35(1) than 
under the Charter or at common law. Is this grant of deference designed 
to reflect the claim that the core relationship to be preserved and to bear 
                                                                                                                       
[hereinafter “Baker”]; Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. 
No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 2002 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”]; Evan Fox-Decent & Alexander 
Pless, “The Charter and Administrative Law Part I: Procedural Fairness” in Flood & Sossin, supra, 
note 12, 237, at 241. But see the cases and commentary in Paul Daly, “Canada’s Bipolar 
Administrative Law: Time for Fusion” (2014) 40:1 Queen’s L.J. 213.  
70  Dunsmuir, id.; Suresh, id. 
71  See, e.g., Doré, supra, note 24; Loyola High School, supra, note 28; T.W.U. (B.C.), 
supra, note 28; T.W.U. (L.S.U.C.), supra, note 28. See also Lorne Sossin & Mark Friedman, 
“Charter Values and Administrative Justice” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 391; Matthew Lewans, 
“Administrative Law, Judicial Deference, and the Charter (2014) 23:2 Constitutional Forum 
Constitutionnel 219. 
72  Bibeault, supra, note 14; Pushpanathan, supra, note 14.  
73  See, e.g., Canada (CHRC), supra, note 14.  
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accountability is the one of Indigenous Peoples with the Crown or with 
administrative agencies, rather than with the courts? Perhaps. But even if 
so, this seems to be a result of a consideration other than that the 
category “question of fact and law”, or the notion of “reasonableness”, is 
a satisfying or coherent proxy for choice of standard of review in the 
circumstances.  
Reflecting on the task at hand when articulating the standard of 
review in cases like Clyde River, Chippewas of the Thames and Ktunaxa 
helps to sharpen the stakes of the debate between categorical and 
contextual approaches to standard of review. This is because the cases 
require one to assess the measure of deference to be shown to the 
decisions of specialized regulatory agencies in a way that does justice to 
the very specific institutional relationships involved: the relationships 
between institutions and Indigenous Peoples, whose constitutional rights 
are at issue when the adequacy of consultation is assessed. The cases 
show that what is at stake when choosing the applicable standard of 
review is not simply whether the question is one of fact or law, but rather 
which institutional relationships are to be preserved, promoted, and 
protected, and how to do so. And thus, at a moment when the Court has 
expressed its intention to reconsider the standard of review analysis in 
place since Dunsmuir,74 the duty to consult context serves not to suggest 
what a revised approach might be, but rather raises queries and 
considerations that warrant reflection in the revision process: queries about 
the roles and relationships of the institutions and actors involved; about the 
character of the rights affected and the qualitative measure of the effects; 
about what is lost and what is gained with a reliance on proxies; and about 
the relationship between confidence, deference, and reasons.  
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT CONFIDENCE DEMANDS 
In The Constitution of Canada: A Contextual Analysis, Jeremy 
Webber reminds us that “[i]n its day-to-day operation, the rule of law 
depends, above all, on mechanisms built into the very structure of state 
institutions, the watchfulness of the public and the cultivation of an ethic 
of legality”.75 In this sense, “the protection of constitutional values 
                                                                                                                       
74  Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 352 (S.C.C.); 
National Football League v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.); Bell 
Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 9 (S.C.C.). 
75  Jeremy Webber, The Constitution of Canada: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2015), at 108.  
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depends more upon systemic controls, embodied in the detailed practices 
and institutions of government — and upon the vigilance of citizens — 
than it does on adjudication alone”.76 To preserve and nourish the rule of 
law, the institutions that carry out the operations of government — 
administrative actors and regulatory agencies among them — need not 
only the authority to act in the service of their delegated mandates, but 
also conditions in which that authority is cultivated and protected. These 
conditions are in part internal, reflected in the institutional morality of 
individual organizations, but also external, expressed through legislative, 
judicial, and popular conceptions of, and interactions with, government 
actors. The narrative of confidence is, as is described in Part II, an 
expression of the law’s contribution to those conditions. When the courts 
show confidence in administrative agencies as valuable participants in 
the common rule of law project, the courts contribute to a culture that 
cultivates strong and sound administrative decision-making. The idea is 
that administrative agencies will strive to live up to the faith that is 
entrusted to them.  
As I discussed in Parts II and III, the Supreme Court’s recent 
judgments in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames reflect and 
advance the confidence that has been percolating in administrative law 
cases outside the duty to consult context. Further, as discussed in Part IV, 
these cases also expose some of the concerns with this confidence for 
broader issues of public law, like its distraction from the role of other 
institutions in reconciliation, statecraft, and institutional design and the 
continued reliance on categories of question in the standard of review 
analysis. Both of the examples explored in Part IV urge an attentiveness 
to the shifts in institutional responsibility and accountability that flow 
from judicial confidence in the administrative state. The lesson there is 
not that the prevailing confidence should be diminished, but rather to 
appreciate its inevitable impact on the architecture of the public order 
more broadly and to account for those shifts when necessary. In this 
Conclusion, let me point to one final implication of the narrative of 
confidence that is revealed by a close reading of Clyde River and 
Chippewas of the Thames, an implication that gazes inward at the 
internal workings and expectations of administrative decision-making 
rather than resting on an examination of the structural whole.  
A culture of confidence in the administrative state is one that takes 
seriously administrative modes of dispute resolution, one that respects 
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the impact of administrative decision-making on citizens and the public 
interest, and one that still strives to cultivate conditions in which the core 
constitutional conversations unfold without resort to the courts. We see 
all of these features at work in Clyde River and Chippewas of the 
Thames. But, it seems, a culture of confidence would also be one that has 
high expectations for the reasons that administrative actors provide for 
their decisions and one that would hold decision-makers accountable for 
failing to meet these expectations. Such expectations and mechanisms of 
accountability would serve as affirmations of the role that reasons play in 
sound decision-making and access to procedural and substantive 
justice.77 Further, such expectations and mechanisms would help to foster 
a culture of administrative decision-making in which affected parties 
learn, in forms and ways that are appropriate to the context, why a 
decision was reached from the decision-maker herself, rather than from 
the courts after judicial review. A culture of decision-making in which 
the courts ultimately hold the key to the reasons for administrative 
decisions effectively forces affected parties, especially those parties who 
are uncertain whether they have been meaningfully heard, properly 
understood, or adequately accommodated, to pursue judicial review. 
Current trends in administrative law do not always lend themselves to 
maintaining meaningful expectations for reason-giving that are 
consistent with a narrative of confidence in the administrative state. 
Rather, recent case law discloses a willingness by the courts to 
supplement, or sometimes provide fully, the reasons that an 
administrative decision-maker offered, or could have offered, to explain 
and justify her decision.78 Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames also 
send mixed signals about what is expected of administrative decision-
makers when it comes to reasons. In Clyde River, adopted in Chippewas 
of the Thames, the Court provides, “... [w]hen affected Indigenous groups 
have squarely raised concerns about Crown consultation with the NEB, 
the NEB must usually address those concerns in reasons, particularly in 
respect of project applications requiring deep consultation.”79 Justices 
Karakatsanis and Brown go on to explain the value of written reasons. 
                                                                                                                       
77  Baker, supra, note 69. 
78  See, e.g., Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ 
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“Written reasons foster reconciliation”, they write, “by showing affected 
Indigenous peoples that their rights were considered and addressed. … 
Reasons are ‘a sign of respect [which] displays the requisite comity and 
courtesy becoming the Crown as Sovereign toward a prior occupying 
nation’”.80 Indeed, they note, “[w]ritten reasons also promote better 
decision making”.81 However, the Court then goes on to qualify these 
expectations about reason-giving, also drawing on a conception of access 
to justice. “This does not mean,” the Court holds,  
that the NEB is always required to review the adequacy of Crown 
consultation by applying a formulaic “Haida analysis”, as the 
appellants suggest. Nor will explicit reasons be required in every case. 
The degree of consideration that is appropriate will depend on the 
circumstances of each case.82  
With these lowered expectations for reason-giving, Clyde River and 
Chippewas of the Thames provide one final diagnostic of the current 
state of administrative law, one that gives rise to one last worry. A 
confidence in the administrative state, one that is worthy of a 
constitutional configuration that is, in essence, a regulatory state, must be 
not only aspirational and affirming, but also demanding. Confidence is 
justified only when accompanied by measures and standards — of fair 
procedure, transparent accountability, and justification, for example — 
that command integrity in our processes and structures of public 
decision-making. When a culture of confidence is stripped of these 
features — that is, when confidence is not tempered by a healthy 
vigilance and skepticism — we risk substituting confidence with 
idealism in our conception of regulatory actors and their contribution to 
governance. In their participation in and contestation of the narrative of 
confidence, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, help us to see — 
and can hopefully help us avoid — moving into such a romantic age of 
administrative law.  
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